The Trump administration insists that its new agreement with Iran is a strategic breakthrough. Supporters argue that it reopens the Strait of Hormuz, reduces the risk of war, and creates space for negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program. Yet beneath the optimistic rhetoric lies a troubling reality: Iran appears poised to receive substantial economic relief before making any meaningful concessions.
That is not diplomacy from a position of strength. It is leverage surrendered before the most important negotiations have even begun.
According to the memorandum of understanding, the United States will immediately waive sanctions on Iranian oil exports and related banking transactions. These sanctions were not symbolic. They represented one of Washington’s most effective tools for constraining a regime that has spent decades funding terrorism, destabilizing the Middle East, and advancing its nuclear ambitions.
The logic behind sanctions has always been straightforward: deny the regime resources until it changes its behavior.
This agreement reverses that formula. Instead of requiring verifiable nuclear concessions before granting relief, the administration is providing relief first and hoping meaningful concessions follow later.
History gives little reason for such confidence.
For years, Iran has mastered the art of negotiation without transformation. It has repeatedly used diplomatic processes to gain time, ease economic pressure, and divide international coalitions while continuing activities that threaten regional security. The regime’s leaders understand that negotiations themselves often become a shield against accountability.
The fundamental question is simple: What exactly has Iran given up?
The regime has once again stated that it does not seek nuclear weapons. Yet Iranian officials have made similar declarations for years. Statements are easy. Verification is difficult.
Meanwhile, sanctions relief carries immediate and measurable consequences.
Every additional barrel of oil exported generates revenue for a government whose priorities are well known. Iran does not merely spend money on domestic development. It finances Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and other proxy forces that threaten American allies throughout the region.
Those realities explain why many Israelis are deeply skeptical of the agreement.
Israelis have watched Iran build an extensive network of armed proxies on their borders. They have endured missile attacks, terrorist campaigns, and repeated threats from Iranian leaders who openly question Israel’s legitimacy. From Jerusalem’s perspective, sanctions relief is not an abstract economic policy. It is potentially a direct source of funding for future threats.
Supporters of the agreement argue that sanctions can always be reimposed if Iran fails to comply. In theory, that is true. In practice, rebuilding economic pressure is often far more difficult than lifting it.
Once companies return to Iranian markets, once oil purchasers adjust supply chains, and once billions of dollars begin flowing through financial channels, the political and economic costs of reversing course increase dramatically. Markets respond to expectations. If businesses conclude Washington lacks the will to enforce sanctions aggressively, deterrence begins to erode long before any formal policy changes occur.
The administration insists that larger incentives may encourage Tehran to accept broader restrictions later. Perhaps. But incentives only work when the other side believes it has something significant to lose.
By granting major economic relief at the outset, Washington risks weakening its strongest bargaining position before negotiations reach their most consequential stage.
This is particularly concerning because Iran enters these talks from a position of unusual weakness. Its economy has struggled under sanctions. Several of its regional proxies have suffered setbacks. Domestic dissatisfaction remains widespread. If there were ever a moment when sustained pressure could produce meaningful concessions, this may be it.
Instead, the agreement offers the regime a financial lifeline.
Peace is a worthy goal. Diplomacy is often preferable to conflict. But successful diplomacy requires realism about the nature of the regime sitting across the negotiating table.
Iran’s leaders have consistently demonstrated that economic relief is not necessarily followed by moderation. Too often, it has been followed by renewed aggression.
The danger of the current agreement is not merely that it could fail. The greater danger is that it could succeed in delivering billions of dollars to the Iranian regime while producing little change in its nuclear ambitions, missile development, or support for terrorist proxies.
The United States should negotiate from a position of strength. That means preserving leverage until verifiable concessions are secured, not surrendering leverage in exchange for promises that may never materialize.
The coming months will reveal whether this agreement represents a diplomatic achievement or another chapter in a familiar cycle. For the sake of regional stability, American interests, and the security of Israel, policymakers must ensure that economic rewards follow genuine behavioral change—not merely the promise of it.