A ceasefire is not peace when the organization that started the war still possesses the means to restart it.
There is a familiar pattern in Middle Eastern diplomacy.
Israel is told that the moment has come to compromise.
The international community promises guarantees.
The terrorist organization promises restraint.
The diplomats announce a framework.
Israel withdraws.
Reconstruction begins.
And the weapons remain.
Then, sometime later, the rockets return.
Israel is told that the next round of violence is unfortunate but understandable.
The process begins again.
Israel should not repeat that mistake in Gaza.
The central question is not whether Hamas can agree to a ceasefire.
It is whether Hamas can be prevented from making the next war.
That is a very different question.
The Disagreement Is Not About Peace
The latest dispute between Jerusalem and Washington is being presented as a disagreement over diplomacy.
It is more fundamental than that.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has rejected the latest U.S.-backed Gaza proposal and said Israel will not withdraw its forces until Hamas has been completely disarmed.
That position should not be dismissed as opposition to peace.
Israel is being asked to trust that an organization responsible for the October 7 massacre will no longer be capable of repeating it.
That requires more than a signature.
It requires a change in the balance of power.
A terrorist organization cannot be considered disarmed because its leaders promise that its weapons will be placed somewhere else.
It cannot be considered defeated because its ministries receive a new name.
And it cannot be considered transformed because its political representatives participate in negotiations.
The guns matter.
The tunnels matter.
The command structure matters.
The money matters.
And the ideology that produced the war matters.
Hamas Has Already Explained the Problem
Hamas does not hide the fact that it regards armed resistance as central to its identity.
Its history demonstrates the difference between tactical concessions and strategic surrender.
When Hamas has accepted political arrangements in the past, the organization has repeatedly sought to preserve the institutions, personnel and military capabilities that give it leverage.
The distinction is critical.
A government can be transferred.
A ministry can be renamed.
A border crossing can change hands.
But if the armed organization remains intact, the underlying power structure has not changed.
The source material’s historical record makes precisely this point: the 2011, 2014 and 2017 arrangements repeatedly postponed the decisive question of who controlled the weapons and security apparatus.
“Later” became the mechanism by which disarmament never happened.
Israel should not accept another version of “later.”
The October 7 Test
There is one question that should govern every Gaza agreement:
Could Hamas do October 7 again?
If the answer is yes, the agreement has failed.
That does not mean every Hamas member must disappear.
It means Hamas cannot retain the military infrastructure necessary to launch another large-scale assault on Israel.
The organization cannot possess an independent army.
It cannot maintain an underground military network.
It cannot manufacture rockets.
It cannot maintain military command centers.
It cannot recruit and train a new generation of fighters.
And it cannot retain a parallel security apparatus capable of intimidating whatever civilian government is supposed to replace it.
Anything less is not demilitarization.
It is rearmament with a delay.
The Weapons Cannot Simply Be Put in a Warehouse
This distinction deserves particular attention.
A destroyed weapons factory is different from a weapons factory placed under nominal civilian control.
A destroyed tunnel is different from a tunnel whose entrance has been sealed.
A dismantled command network is different from commanders who have temporarily stopped using it.
And weapons stored today can be retrieved tomorrow.
The question is therefore not simply:
Where are the weapons?
It is:
Who controls them, who can access them, and who has the authority to use them?
If the answer remains Hamas—or Hamas-linked personnel—the organization has not been disarmed.
It has merely been told to wait.
International Monitors Are Not a Substitute for Sovereignty
There is another seductive assumption in these negotiations: that international monitors can solve the problem.
They can help.
They cannot substitute for reality.
A monitoring mission can inspect facilities.
It can report violations.
It can document suspicious activity.
But an international observer does not automatically possess the authority to enter every building, seize every weapon, arrest every commander or dismantle every clandestine network.
The organization being monitored must ultimately be denied the ability to resist.
That requires a security authority with both the legitimacy and the capability to enforce the agreement.
If Hamas remains the most powerful armed organization inside Gaza, no international committee can magically change that fact.
Israel Has Learned This Lesson Before
Israel’s skepticism is not theoretical.
Israel has repeatedly entered arrangements that were supposed to produce stability while armed Palestinian organizations retained significant capabilities.
The result was not permanent peace.
It was another round.
This is why the burden of proof should not rest on Israel to demonstrate why it deserves security.
The burden should rest on those proposing Israeli withdrawal.
They should demonstrate that Hamas can no longer wage war.
Not that Hamas has promised not to.
Not that Hamas has agreed to a political document.
Not that mediators believe Hamas has changed.
That Hamas cannot.
There is a profound difference between intention and capability.
Israel’s security should depend on the latter.
Reconstruction Must Follow Security
Gaza needs reconstruction.
Palestinian civilians need functioning hospitals, schools, housing, electricity, water and economic opportunity.
None of that requires Hamas to retain control.
In fact, reconstruction can become an instrument for preventing another war if it is tied to genuine demilitarization.
The sequence matters.
Weapons first.
Command structures dismantled.
Security institutions vetted.
Then reconstruction.
Then political advancement.
If the order is reversed, reconstruction money can become another resource available to the organization that eventually restarts the conflict.
The source material makes the same distinction: genuine settlement requires destroyed weapons and tunnels, dismantled command networks, individual vetting and external control before reconstruction money or statehood advances.
That is not punishment.
It is risk management.
The Palestinian Civilian Is Not Hamas
There is also a moral distinction that Israel’s supporters should make clearly.
Opposing Hamas’s continued military power does not mean opposing Palestinian civilians.
Those are different things.
A Palestinian child should be able to grow up without Hamas’s rule.
A Palestinian family should be able to live without fearing Hamas’s security apparatus.
A Palestinian businessman should be able to build a company without paying money to a terrorist organization.
A Palestinian government should eventually be able to govern without a militia standing behind it.
Demilitarizing Hamas is therefore not merely an Israeli demand.
It is potentially the foundation for a Palestinian future that is not permanently subordinated to armed factions.
Peace Requires Irreversibility
The word “peace” is used too easily.
A pause in fighting is not necessarily peace.
A ceasefire is not necessarily peace.
A political agreement is not necessarily peace.
Peace requires that the parties have both the intention and the capability to maintain the settlement.
That is why irreversible measures matter.
A tunnel destroyed cannot suddenly reopen itself.
A weapons factory dismantled cannot manufacture rockets tomorrow.
A command structure dismantled cannot issue orders unless it is rebuilt.
A terrorist army genuinely disarmed cannot suddenly mobilize for another October 7.
That is the standard Israel should demand.
Not perfection.
Not humiliation.
Irreversibility.
Washington Should Understand Israel’s Position
The United States has every reason to want this war to end.
America has strategic interests in the Middle East.
It has troops and allies throughout the region.
It has an interest in reducing Iranian influence.
It wants reconstruction.
It wants diplomatic progress.
And President Trump understandably wants to transform military victory into a durable political settlement.
But American pressure should not force Israel to accept the one outcome that would make another war inevitable.
The fastest path to peace is not necessarily the shortest agreement.
Sometimes the quickest way to end a war is to remove the enemy’s ability to restart it.
That is what Israel is asking for.
The Question Is Simple
Before Israel withdraws from Gaza, before reconstruction money pours in, before political institutions are recognized and before the international community celebrates another historic agreement, there is one question that should be answered.
Where are Hamas’s weapons?
Then ask:
Who controls them?
Who can inspect them?
Who can seize them?
Who can prevent their replacement?
Who controls the tunnels?
Who controls the police?
Who controls the borders?
Who controls the money?
And who has the authority to stop Hamas if it decides tomorrow that the agreement is no longer convenient?
If those questions do not have clear answers, then Israel is not being offered peace.
It is being offered another interval.
And Israel has already paid too high a price for intervals.
The goal should not be to create a Gaza in which Hamas agrees not to attack Israel.
The goal should be to create a Gaza in which Hamas cannot attack Israel.
That is the difference between a ceasefire and peace.
And after October 7, Israel has every right to insist on the difference.